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Abstract 
This paper investigates the ‘price-concentration’ relationship in pricing syndicated loans. 
By measuring bank concentration at a state level in U.S, we show supporting evidence to 
market power hypothesis that syndicated loan prices are positively associated with the 
concentration of both borrower’s and lead arranger’s markets but not the concentration of 
participant lenders’ markets. We also show that loan prices are more sensitively to lead 
arranger’s market concentration than to borrower’s and a borrower could reduce loan costs 
by borrowing from a less concentrated bank market. In sharp contrast, loan prices are 
negatively associated with bank concentration if a loan syndication is led by an investment 
bank or non-bank financial institution. Our findings are robust to a variety of bank 
concentration measures and model specification. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been ample empirical evidence on the ‘price-concentration’ relationship in banking and 
bilateral loans where on one hand, corporate loan rates are found to be positively associated with banking 
market concentration in U.S. (Cyrnak and Hannan 1999), Italy (Sapienza 2002) and Belgium (Degryse and 
Ongena 2005), supporting market power hypothesis. On the other hand, bank-efficiency model and 
information-based hypothesis conjecture a negative ‘price-concentration’ relationship (Demsetz 1973; 
Fungáčová et al. 2017). Compared with bilateral loans, syndicated loans carry a nature of ‘three-party’ 
game and in additional to lead arranger and borrower, participant lenders also play an important role in loan 
syndication. Hence, such a ‘three party’ game involves additional adverse selection and moral hazards 
problems (Ivashina 2009) and lenders from different bank markets may have different pricing mechanisms 
in loan syndication. Whereas, there has been little empirical evidence on the ‘price-concentration’ 
relationship in a syndicated loan setting, except for Lian (2017) and Hasan et al. (2017) which have 
investigated such a relationship in borrower’s market only. To advance our understanding on such a 
relationship in syndicated loan, we consider the effects of bank competition from all three markets (lead 
arranger, participant lenders and borrower) on syndicated loan prices and in addition, we also investigate 
the moderating effects of lender types on such a ‘price-concentration’ relationship where non-commercial 
banks and non-bank institutions usually charge higher prices than commercial banks (Lim et al. 2014). 
We test the ‘price-concentration’ relationship between syndicated loan prices and bank market 
concentration at a state level in U.S. which, first, is ideal for the scenario where a lead arranger headquarters 
in a different bank market from the borrower, enabling us to investigate the effects of the difference of bank 
concentration from two different markets on syndicated loan prices. We expect that the concentration of 
both borrower’s and lead arranger’s markets would affect loan prices and lenders of different types (e.g., 
banks vs. non-banks) would have different sensitivities to bank market concentration in pricing syndicated 
loans due to the heterogeneity of their liquidity, costs and lending portfolio risk. To this end, we identify 
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the location (state) and measure the bank market concentration where both the borrower and the lead 
arranger headquarter. Both of them may face the same market concentration if they headquarter in the same 
states (12% of our samples) and they may face different bank market structure where a lead arranger comes 
from a more competitive (39%) or a more concentrated bank market (49%) than the borrower’s market. 
Second, we use share-weighted bank market concentration to capture the bank market power of participant 
lenders and finally, we identify the type of lead arranger (87% commercial banks and 13% investment 
banks or non banks) to examine the heterogeneity of the price sensitivity to banking market concentration.   
Consistent with Lian (2017), our results show that the bank concentration in borrower’s market 
increases syndicated loan prices, in terms of fees, spread and overlibor. By adding new evidence to literature, 
we also show that syndicated loan prices are more sensitive to the bank concentration of lender’s market 
than that of borrower’s market. Hence, borrowers will benefit from lower syndicated loan prices if they are 
located in a less concentrated bank market than the lead arranger’s. This result is consistent with the ‘auction’ 
nature of loan syndication where loan prices charged in borrower’s market reflect an equilibrium of lenders’ 
markets (Lim et al. 2014). We find little evidence that the bank concentration of participant lenders have 
any impacts on syndicated loan prices.  
In sharp contrast to commercial banks, investment bank and non-bank lead arrangers charge lower 
prices if they face a stronger bank concentration, supporting the structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
in bank markets. Our results are robust to various bank concentration measures (e.g. CRk, HHI and number 
of branches), model specifications and endogeneity check. The effects of bank concentration on syndicated 
loan prices are economically significant and overall, for example, a standard deviation increase of bank 
concentration ratio in lead arranger’s market (CR50Lead) would raise the overlibor of a typical syndicated 
loan ($366 million) by 4.15 base points, equivalent to around $152,000 additional costs for a corporate 
borrower.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review literature on the 
relationship between bank concentration and loan prices and develop hypotheses. We describe our data, 
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variables and baseline model specification in Section 3 and report the empirical results in Section 4. Finally, 
we conclude our findings with implications in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature review and developing hypothesis 
In recent years, syndicated credit continuously performs its crucial role in the global financial system, 
with a total volume of $4.7 trillion in 2015, compared with $3.02 trillion in the international bond market 
for non-financial companies. U.S dominates the global syndicated loan market with $938.6 billion in the 
first half of 2016 out of $1.8 trillion globally1. Syndicated loans provide corporate borrowers a large sum 
and stable funds at relatively lower interest rates than bilateral loans, bonds and equities (Altunbaş and 
Gadanecz 2004) and enable them to build and keep business relationships with multiple lenders. Moreover, 
syndicated loans provide lenders an efficient mechanism to diversify loan risk via dispersing portfolio into 
multiple lenders and to bypass regulations on the maximum size of a single loan2.  
There has been ample empirical evidence on the determination of syndicated loan prices in terms of 
the participation of non-bank lenders (Lim et al. 2014), foreign banks (Haselmann and Wachtel 2011), the 
roles played by ethical behavior (Kim et al. 2014), corporate social responsibility (Bae et al. 2018) and 
asymmetric information (Ivashina 2009). However, what is less understood is the effects of bank market 
concentration on syndicated loan prices. Such a ‘price-concentration’ relationship could be understood 
within three competing theoretical frameworks: structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SCP), structure-
efficient hypothesis (SE) and information-based hypothesis (IB). 
                                                     
1  The information is collected from Thomson Global Syndicated Loans Reviews and Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). 
2 The lending limits as defined in FDIC law, §32.3, where the maximum size of loan to single borrower is 15% of the 
bank’s or savings association’s capital and surplus.  
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SCP, also known as market power hypothesis, proposes that banks with a greater market power would 
charge higher prices on loans for two reasons. First, due to their market power, banks maximize profits by 
charging higher rates on loans and paying lower interests on deposits, leading to credit rationing (e.g. 
Guzman 2000; Pagano 1993). Second, banks with a greater market power charge higher prices on loans 
because of their cost inefficiency (Ariss 2010; Delis and Tsionas 2009). In contrast, the structure-efficient 
model (SE) proposes that banks with a higher market share would charge lower prices on loans due to their 
improved productivity technology and efficient management, which have helped them reduce costs, gain 
higher profits and take over a bigger market share (Demsetz 1973). The information-based hypothesis (IB), 
instead, indicates that banks with a greater market power would have stronger incentives to acquire private 
information from borrowers and to improve credit availability, especially to those financially constrained 
borrowers. Hence, banks with monopoly power could help firms by providing loans at a relatively lower 
prices (Fungáčová et al. 2017; Jackson and Thomas 1995) and extract rent in the future from those who are 
eventually successful (Cetorelli and Gambera 2001; Petersen and Rajan 1995; Sharpe 1990; von Thadden 
2004).  
To examine the ‘bank concentration – loan price’ relationship, recent empirical studies have focused 
on the structure (HHI or Lerner Index) of borrower’s bank market (e.g. Hasan et al. 2017; Lian 2017). Such 
an investigation has become increasingly important since the removal of interstate banking and branching 
restrictions by Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 1990s. Banking market 
deregulation, especially on interstate banking, has enabled banks to geographically diversify risk across 
state borders (Amore et al. 2013) so that distant banks (e.g. headquartered in another state) would compete 
against local banks and borrowers can borrow from ‘distant’ banks locally. The empirical evidence of (Lian 
2017) is in favor of market power hypothesis (Cetorelli and Strahan 2006) where in borrower’s market, 
bank competition drives up credit supply and therefore reduces loan prices. This is in sharp contrast to the 
conjecture of asymmetric information hypothesis (Petersen and Rajan 1995) that bank competition reduces 
relationship banking. We credit the originality of such an investigation to Lian (2017) which considers the 
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scenario where borrowers borrow locally from either local lenders or distant lenders which run branches in 
borrower’s market. In addition, we also propose that borrower’s market concentration matters for loan 
pricing even they borrow from distant markets. This is because distant lenders need to offer a more 
competitive price to compete with local lenders (Degryse and Ongena 2005) and to compensate borrower’s 
additional costs incurred in accessing distant finance, such as transportation. Therefore, we hypothesize that   
 
 Hypothesis 1: Syndicated loan prices are positively associated with bank concentration in borrower’s 
market.  
 
Lian (2017) comprehensively examines how the bank concentration of borrower’s market affects 
syndicated loan prices. We hypothesize that the bank concentration of lead arranger’s market also matters 
in pricing loans and this applies to both scenarios where either distant banks enter borrower’s market to 
compete with local lenders or borrowers reach out distant credit in distant location. In the former scenario, 
bank concentration of lead arranger’s market matters for loan price because it determines the costs of capital 
for banks. It has been widely acknowledged that according to SCP, banks would have lower costs of 
deposits if they have a greater power in a deposit market (e.g. Guzman 2000; Pagano 1993) and for risk 
diversification reasons (Amore et al. 2013), distant banks who operate branches locally may channel 
deposits from their headquarter location to the new market they enter. In such a scenario, the syndicated 
loan price would be negatively related to lead arranger’s bank market concentration if the lead arrangers 
have lower costs of capital. It is also possible that syndicated loan prices increase with lead arranger’s bank 
market concentration if lead arrangers charge comparable price to both local and distant borrowers.      
The latter scenario proposes a possibility that borrowers reach out to raise funds from distant market 
directly because of the overlap between industrial and financial markets (Asker and Ljungqvist 2010) and 
the development of information technologies in financing businesses even distant banks do not have local 
branches in the market where borrower locates (Petersen and Rajan 2002). Theoretically, borrowers may 
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do so because of the indirect competition theory in banking sector (Osborne 1988) where the geographical 
span of the industrial markets in which borrowers operate affect their demand for credit in distant market 
(Bellón 2016). Therefore, a borrower would not be financially disadvantaged if its key competitor locates 
in a distant location. The spatial price discrimination theory (Degryse and Ongena 2005) also states that 
distance between lender and borrower and the distance between borrower and competing banks would 
mitigate the bank market concentration effects on loan prices. Recent literature has offered both theoretical 
justification (e.g. Bellón 2016) and empirical evidence (e.g. Tian and Han 2018), supporting the ‘reach-out’ 
scenario3. In such a scenario, the ‘price-concentration’ relationship would be positive and distant borrowers 
would be charged higher prices on loans if the lead arranger has a greater market power in its own market. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that 
 
Hypothesis 2: Syndicated loan prices are associated with bank concentration in lead arranger’s market. 
 
Apart from borrower and lead arranger, participant lenders also play an important role in loan 
syndication. This is because first, in additional to the agency problem between lenders and borrowers, 
participant lenders may face further adverse selection and moral hazard problems when syndicating loans 
with lead arrangers (Ivashina 2009). Second, participant lenders have an information disadvantage against 
lead arrangers on the creditability of borrowers due to their weaker incentives to invest in costly private 
information collection4. Above mentioned theories may also apply to participant’s market where loan prices 
could be associated with participant’s market concentration. Another possibility is that loan prices would 
                                                     
3 Our data and information from FDIC also provide empirical evidence to support such a possibility. For example, 
FDIC shows that only 2 banks headquartered in Arizona operate interstate banking and branching in another 4 states. 
These two banks, however, lead syndicated loans for borrowers from 26 states in total. 
4 A lead arranger may face a free-riding problem by participant lenders in information collection and monitoring (Lee 
and Mullineaux 2004) if participant lenders hold a small portion of loans (9.6% averagely for each participant in our 
data).   
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not be sensitive to participant’s market concentration because in the syndication process, the prime loan 
terms (loan size, maturity, price, etc.) have been set before lead arrangers invite participant lenders (Dennis 
and Mullineaux 2000; Esty 2001). Even though, participant lenders can require the lead arranger to reset 
the loan terms especially when the loan is undersubscribed or the request is raised by all participant lenders. 
Hence, we hypothesize 
 
Hypothesis 3: Syndicated loan prices are associated with the bank market concentration of participant 
lenders. 
 
There has been ample empirical evidence on the determinant roles played by the type of lenders in pricing 
loans due to the heterogeneity of their liquidity, costs, and lending portfolio risk. Syndicated loans issued 
by non-commercial bank and non-bank lenders are usually charged higher prices than those issued by 
commercial banks only in loan syndication. This is especially prominent for loans issued by hedge funds 
and private equity investors, loans raised by financial constrained borrowers and when loans are less 
available from commercial banks (Lim et al. 2014). Higher loan prices are charged by non-bank lenders to 
compensate for their liquidity and usual fees charged on financial services. In addition, for asymmetric 
information reasons, non-bank institutional investors may charge a higher spread on syndicated loans when 
they have less information about the loan quality than the lead arranger who conducts borrower’s due 
diligence. As a result, “adverse selection could delay the syndication process and make institutional 
investors demand a higher spread” (Ivashina and Sun 2011, p.501). Also due to the information 
disadvantages, loans with participating non-bank lenders are more difficult to be restructured in financial 
distress than bank loans (Demiroglu and James 2015). Empirical studies have suggested that non-bank 
institutions and investment banks participate in loan syndication especially when commercial banks lack of 
funds or borrowing firms are facing financial constraints (Lim et al. 2014). Therefore, non-bank financial 
institutions usually charge higher prices on syndicated loans because of their higher managing fee, less 
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special and sustainable funds to syndicate and being in favor of less profitable and high leveraged firms 
(Harjoto et al. 2006). 
 
In addition to the above conjectured ‘price-concentration’ relationship, we propose that such a relationship 
may vary between loan issued by commercial banks and non-commercial bank financial institutions (e.g. 
investment banks and non banks). Based on SCP, commercial banks will pay lower interests on deposits 
and charge higher interests on loans issued to corporate borrowers (e.g. Guzman 2000; Pagano 1993). 
Thereofore, those non-commercial bank financial institutions will be able to obtain funds from commerical 
banks with lower costs (Ahmed et al. 2015) and to offer more competitve syndicated loan prices to 
borrowers (Gropp et al. 2014) in a more concentrated bank market. Hence, we hypothesize 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: The ‘price-concentration’ relationship may vary over lender type. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data  
We collect data on syndicated loans from DealScan and bank data from Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) between 1994 and 20125. Firm-level information on borrowers is collected from 
Compustat and macroeconomic data are from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. DealScan provides 
                                                     
5 The information on bank market structure from FDIC covers a period since 1994 and the Compustat-DealScan table 
covers a period until 2012 (Chava and Roberts 2008).  
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detailed information on loan characteristics (e.g. spread, maturity, amount, and purpose), borrower’s 
information (e.g. name, location, and industry) and lender’s characteristics (e.g. name, location, share 
allocation, type, and lender role in syndication). We use Compustat-DealScan linking table (Chava and 
Roberts 2008) to match syndicated loans and borrowers’ information. We match bank concentration to 
syndicated loan based on the location of the borrower and lenders (lead arranger and the participant lenders) 
at state level. We focus on syndicated loan samples so as we have a full set of information for borrowers, 
lenders, and local (state level) banking concentration. We exclude sample loans issued to foreign borrowers, 
those with missing location information and those raised by financial institutions and in total, we use 33,023 
syndicated loan samples between 1994 and 2012 in the following empirical analysis.  
 
3.2. Syndicated loan price and facility characteristics 
We measure syndicated loan price by fees, overlibor and spread. Fees (commitment fee and annual 
fee) are used to price options6, overlibor – rate over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) - is to 
measure syndicated loan rate and spread (all-in-drawn spread) is the total of the annual fee and overlibor 
(Chan et al. 2015). To examine the effects of banking market concentration on syndicated loan prices, we 
follow (Lim et al. 2014) and control for loan facility characteristics, such as loan size, maturity, number of 
lenders, term loan, having covenants and performance price features. To further investigate the 
                                                     
6 Fees are used to price cancellation and drawdown options and to screen borrowers who possess private information 
to exercise the fee options by which lenders could learn the likelihood of borrower’s future credit line usage by the 
combination of loan spread options and commitment fee options (Berg et al. 2015). Commitment fee also enhances 
bank reputation by keeping its promise, prevents bank from extracting extra rents by intimidating to withhold credit, 
and weakens the effects of moral hazard. Borrowers have an option to draw on a line of credit and each line of credit 
provides the borrower with an option to draw at a pre-specified spread. Borrowers would be more likely to draw down 
their lines of credit when spot market spreads are high (Berg et al. 2015). With different combinations of fee and 
spread, lender can predict future behavior of borrower. For example, if borrowers choose contracts with low fee and 
high spread, they are more likely to draw down their credit lines. 
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heterogeneity of banking market concentration effects, we follow Lim et al. (2014) and control for the type 
of lead arranger as commercial banks and non-commercial bank lenders (investment bank and other non-
bank financial institutions, e.g., hedge funds). We define the lead arranger as the key lender who plays a 
role as ‘administrative agent’, ‘agent’, ‘arranger’, ‘bookrunner’, ‘lead arranger’, ‘lead bank’, ‘lead manager’ 
or ‘Mandated lead arranger’ in loan syndication (Ivashina 2009; Taylor and Sansone 2007) and exclude 
loan samples (2% of total samples) with multiple lead arrangers by following (Ivashina and Scharfstein 
2010).  
 
3.3. Measuring banking market concentration 
We follow Lian (2017) and use structural measures, such as concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), at a state level in U.S to evaluate the concentration of local banking market where 
the borrower and the lead arranger located, respectively7. We calculate the state level market concentration 
of the participant lenders based on the loan shares they hold8. We use state-level bank concentration instead 
of bank level market power in the analysis because whether a lending bank exercises its market power is 
mainly dependent on local bank market structure (Hasan et al. 2017). CRk has been widely used in 
measuring bank market concentration (Bikker and Haaf 2002) and in specific, we make a distinction 
                                                     
7 We measure market concentration at a state level for three reasons. (1) Banks operating in multiple MSAs usually 
set uniform-prices which are independent from MSA market concentration (e.g. Heitfield and Prager 2004; Heitfield 
1999; Radecki 1998). (2) States still have considerable leeway to decide the rules in governing entry by out-of-state 
banks since IBBEA (e.g. Johnson and Rice 2008; Rice and Strahan 2010). (3) Due to the size of syndicated loan 
(averaged at $366 m) and borrower (averaged asset value of $5.02 billion), it is highly likely that syndicated loans are 
raised ‘distantly’ across county and MSA. Therefore, defining the local market at county or metropolitan area is no 
longer evident and instead, state boundaries seem to be appropriate for bank market (e.g. Radecki 1998).  
8 We do not have information on foreign banks and only consider U.S banks in participating loan syndication, 
accounting for 70% of total participant lenders in U.S syndicated loan markets.  
 12 
 
between the banking market where a borrower locates (CRkBorrower) and that where the lead arranger 
headquarters (CRkLeader). If both borrower and lenders are in the same state, they will face the same banking 
market structure. We use CR50 in the main tests and HHI, CR20, CR10 and other concentration ratios in 
robustness tests to fully capture the bank market concentration effects on syndicated loan prices. In addition, 
we use deposit CRk and HHI at state branch level in our main tests and deposit HHI at state bank level and 
MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) branch level (Lian 2017) in robustness tests. 
 
3.4 Control variables and baseline model specification 
In the following empirical analysis, we follow Ivashina (2009) and control for borrower’s 
characteristics by assets, tangibility, profitability and credit risk by S&P credit rating. We also control for 
macroeconomic conditions at state level, such as annual personal income and state gross domestic product 
(Gelos et al. 2011; Schuermann 2004). We report the definition and source of each variable used in 
Appendix. To examine the effects of banking market concentration on syndicated loan price, we have the 
baseline model specification (Eq.1) as follows: 
 
         𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 = 𝜕 + 𝛽 × 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛾 ×
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃 × 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀 ∙∙∙∙∙  (1) 
 
where syndicated loan price is measured by fees, spread and overlibor, banking market concentration is 
measured by CRk and HHI at branch level and control variables are the characteristics of loan facility (e.g. 
loan size, maturity, number of lenders, term loan indicator, covenants indicator, performance pricing 
indicator), borrower chateratersitics (e.g. assets, tangibility, profitability and S&P rating indicator) and 
macroeconomic condition (personal income and GDP at state level), where we match firm financial data 
from the fiscal year (t-1) prior to the loan issue year (t). Definition of control variables is presented by 
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Appendix. In addition, we also control for the aggregate trends in year, loan type and lender type to 
eliminate the effects driven by such factors.    
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis and on average, 
a syndicated loan is charged for fees at 30 base points (bps), overlibor at 174 bps and spread at 189 bps. In 
the state where the borrower (lead arranger) locates, top 50 bank branches own 31% (37%) market share of 
deposits. Averagely, a state in U.S has branch (bank) deposit HHI of 0.01 (0.11), indicating that first, there 
is a big variation between the branch concentration and bank concentration in a specific state. Second, 
banking market is concentrated in U.S. Table 1 also shows that overall, syndicated loans are more likely to 
be raised from more concentrated bank markets (CR50
Difference = CR50
Borrower - CR50
Lead <0). Averagely, there 
are about 3,300 branches per state, equivalent to 0.3 per 1,000 population and 0.03 per km2.  
An average syndicated loan size is $366 million with 46 months maturity and 9 lenders participating 
in the loan syndication. A quarter of our loan samples are term loans, 62% have covenants and 48% have 
performance pricing features. In terms of the characteristics of syndicated loan borrowers, an average 
borrower has an asset value of $5 billion and its tangible assets account for 32% of total assets with a 
profitability (net income/total assets) of -1% and 54% of facilities have a S&P credit rating between AAA 
and BBB. Table 2 reports Pearson’s correlation matrix between the key variables and it shows that overall, 
syndicated loan price is positively correlated with banking market concentration measures for both lead 
arranger’s and borrower’s bank market.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Samples collected are between 1994 and 2012 with 33,023 observations. Syndicated loan price is measured by spread, 
fees and overlibor. Banking market concentration is measured by concentration ratio (top 50, 20 and 10) in the state 
where borrower, lead arranger and participant lenders located, respectively and HHI on deposit at branch and bank 
level respectively. 
 Mean Std. Dev Median 
Syndicated loan Price    
Fees (base points) 30.49 24.09 25 
Overlibor (base points) 174.34 112.24 175 
Spread (base points) 189.26 115.84 175 
Bank market concentration    
CR50
Borrower 0.31 0.12 0.28 
CR50
Lead 0.37 0.12 0.36 
CR50
Participant 0.31 0.12 0.33 
CR50
Difference -0.07 0.14 -0.07 
CR20
Borrower 0.25 0.12 0.22 
CR10
Borrower 0.21 0.12 0.18 
HHI (Branch) Borrower 0.01 0.03 0.01 
HHI (Bank) Borrower 0.11 0.11 0.08 
Number_Branch Borrower 3297 2314 3150 
Branch density by population (1,000) Borrower 0.3 0.27 0.24 
Branch density by km2 Borrower 0.03 0.04 0.02 
HHI(MSA, Branch)Borrower 0.13 0.07 0.12 
Facility Characteristics    
Loan size (USD$ m) 366 793 150 
Loan maturity (months) 46.19 24.46 48 
Total number of lenders 8.52 9.03 6 
Term loan (0,1) 0.26 0.44 0 
Secured indicator (0,1) 0.72 0.45 1 
Covenant indicator (0,1) 0.62 0.48 1 
Performance pricing feature (0,1) 0.48 0.50 0 
Borrower Firm Characteristics    
Asset (USD$ m) 5026.32 8464.28 1382.82 
Tangibility 0.32 0.25 0.26 
Profitability -0.01 0.54 0.03 
S&P Rating (0,1) 0.54 0.50 1 
Macroeconomic Factors    
State personal yearly income (USD$ 000) 33.28 7.53 32.78 
State Gross Domestic Product (USD$ b) 539 448 392 
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Table 2: Correlation Table 
Samples collected are between 1994 and 2012 with 33,023 observations. Syndicated loan price is measured by spread, fees and overlibor. Banking market 
concentration is measured by concentration ratio (top 50, 20 and 10) in the state where borrower, lead arranger and participant lenders located, respectively and HHI 
on deposit at branch and bank level respectively.* denotes statistical significance level of 5%. 
 Spread Fees Overlibor CR50Borrower CR50Lead CR50Participant CR50Difference CR20Borrower CR10Borrower HHI(Branch)Borrower 
Spread 1          
Fees 0.7186* 1         
Overlibor 0.9061* 0.7250* 1        
CR50Borrower 0.0620* 0.0342* 0.0305* 1       
CR50Lead 0.0272* 0.0135 0.0700* 0.2701* 1      
CR50Participant -0.1145* -0.1264* -0.0699* 0.2611* 0.2999* 1     
CR50Difference 0.0155* 0.0090 -0.0359* 0.6166* -0.5915* -0.0394* 1    
CR20Borrower 0.0675* 0.0325* 0.0372* 0.9778* 0.2854* 0.2768* 0.5847* 1   
CR10Borrower 0.0670* 0.0295* 0.0373* 0.9525* 0.2818* 0.2753* 0.5656* 0.9942* 1  
HHI(Branch)Borrower 0.0444* 0.0444* 0.0244* 0.0186* 0.6393* 0.1511* 001517* 0.6528* 0.6478* 1 
HHI(Bank)Borrower 0.0595* 0.0176* 0.0223* 0.4289* 0.1285* 0.1288* 0.2541* 0.4282* 0.4337* 0.2967* 
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4.2 Baseline results 
We employ the baseline model (Eq. 1) to investigate the effects of banking market concentration on 
syndicated loan price and the results are reported in Table 3. In specific, Models 1-3 consider the effects of 
bank concentration of borrower’s market (H1) and Models 4-6 consider the effects of lead arranger’s market 
(H2) where the lead arranger is possibly from a different state with different bank concentration from that 
of the borrower. Overall, Table 3 shows that after controlling for a rich set of variables and fixed effects, 
syndicated loan borrowers would pay a higher cost, in terms of fees, spread and overlibor, in a more 
concentrated banking market with higher CR50, supporting market power hypothesis. In particular, 
borrowers would be charged higher prices, such as fees (commitment fee and annual fee) and overlibor, if 
they locate in a more concentrated bank market, supporting both H1 and H2. Specifically, a standard 
deviation increase in borrower’s market bank concentration (CR50Borrower) would increase fees by 3%, 
consisting with Lian (2017) and Hasan et al. (2017). A standard deviation (0.12) increase in CR50Lead would 
raise the overlibor of a typical syndicated loan by 4.15 base points, equivalent to around $152,000 additional 
costs for a borrower with an average size of syndicated loan ($366 million).  
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Table 3: Baseline results: banking market concentration and syndicated loan price 
Samples collected are between 1994 and 2012 with 33,023 observations. Syndicated loan price is measured by spread, 
fees and overlibor. Banking market concentration is measured by concentration ratio (top 50) in the state where 
borrower and lead arranger located, respectively. ‘Performance pricing indicator’ is defined as a dummy and coded 
as 1 if overlibor spread of a sample loan is based on borrower’s subsequent performance; therefore, we do not consider 
it in overlibor models (3 and 6). We also control for the fixed effects of loan type, lender type and year. Standard 
errors are clustered at lender-firm year level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance 
level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Spread Fees Overlibor Spread Fees Overlibor 
Banking Market concentration       
CRK50Borrower 22.67*** 7.10*** 14.57*    
 (6.13) (1.79) (8.27)    
CRK50Lender    21.64*** 10.90*** 34.61*** 
    (7.37) (1.87) (9.50) 
Loan facility       
Log (Loan size) -13.52*** -3.26*** -14.41*** -14.64*** -3.50*** -14.35*** 
 (0.69) (0.25) (1.02) (0.78) (0.28) (1.09) 
Loan maturity 0.28*** 0.17*** 0.64*** 0.25*** 0.15*** 0.60*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) 
Total number of lenders 0.03 0.06** 0.01 0.14* 0.10*** 0.12 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.11) 
Term loan dummy 52.80*** 13.01*** 34.87*** 52.10*** 11.73** 34.39*** 
 (1.34) (4.07) (1.83) (1.54) (5.22) (2.00) 
Secured indicator 91.31*** 17.97*** 102.85*** 91.32*** 17.70*** 100.30*** 
 (6.67) (0.39) (1.87) (1.81) (0.41) (2.05) 
Covenants indicator 18.34*** 3.84*** 0.73 20.68*** 3.46*** 0.85 
 (1.68) (0.50) (3.01) (1.91) (0.55) (3.33) 
Performance pricing indicator -35.21*** -3.29***  -35.92*** -3.09***  
 (1.48) (0.49)  (1.68) (0.55)  
Borrower’s characteristics       
Log (Asset) -12.80*** -1.30*** -21.84*** -12.52*** -1.36*** -22.27*** 
 (0.62) (0.23) (0.97) (0.70) (0.26) (1.00) 
Tangibility 0.09 3.25*** -6.07* -0.94 2.184*** -8.41** 
 (2.50) (0.65) (3.29) (2.82) (0.72) (3.65) 
Profitability -8.05** -2.84*** -4.89 -8.09** -2.73*** -4.15 
 (3.57) (0.78) (3.33) (3.77) (0.66) (2.60) 
S&P Rating -19.49*** -4.022*** -15.47*** -19.23*** -4.232*** -14.17*** 
 (1.46) (0.42) (1.91) (1.64) (0.46) (2.12) 
State macroeconomics factors       
State personal income -0.84*** -0.10** -1.30*** -0.77*** -0.10** -1.42*** 
 (0.14) (0.04) (0.19) (0.16) (0.05) (0.21) 
Log (GDP) 1.73** 0.49** 3.27*** 1.39* 0.08 1.84* 
 (0.78) (0.25) (1.03) (0.80) (0.25) (1.07) 
Constant 589.8 71.86 694.7*** 782.1*** 109.7*** 615.9*** 
 (538,656) (16,244) (32.15) (27.25) (24.96) (34.61) 
Observations 28,198 18,225 14,470 21,963 14,563 11,320 
R-squared 0.516 0.325 0.520 0.525 0.327 0.533 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Purpose FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
LenderType FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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4.2.1 Bank concentration: borrower’s market vs. lead arranger’s market 
With the development of new information and communication technologies, banks have become able 
to lend to borrowers locating farther away from them (Felici and Pagnini 2008). Even though, the 
geographic distance between them would cause high costs for banks to ex ante screen and ex post monitor 
borrowers and therefore, syndicated loans are more likely to be led by domestic banks which are 
geographically close to borrowers (Lin et al. 2012). However, it is not intuitively straightforward to predict 
the sensitivity of syndicated loan price to banking market concentration. Because of the cost efficiency for 
lenders to monitor borrowers in the same state, one possibility could be that loan prices would be less 
sensitive to banking market concentration where borrowers could share the cost savings for lenders by 
paying lower prices (Degryse and Ongena 2005). In contrast, market power hypothesis suggests that same-
state lenders would create rents from geographic proximity by charging higher prices from local borrowers 
who would have to undertake greater costs (e.g. transportation) to approach alternative lenders farther away 
from them (Degryse and Ongena 2005). Rent creation would be possibly associated with the market share 
of local lenders and therefore, syndicated loan prices could be more sensitive to banking market 
concentration.  
To address this issue, we categorize our samples into two groups and re-run Eq. (1). We report the 
results in Table 4 where we consider same-state lending relations (borrower and lead arranger locating in 
the same state) in Models 1-3 and different state relations in Models 4-69. Table 4 shows that, first, our key 
result still holds that banking market concentration raises syndicated loan price in terms of fees, spread and 
overlibor. Second, if the borrower and lender locate in the same state, syndicated loan price would be more 
sensitive to banking market concentration than in different states, supporting above market power 
                                                     
9 We also use endogenous switching regression model corresponding to the possible endogenous selection between 
same-state lead arranger and out-state lead arranger. The results are consistent with Table 4 and available on request 
from authors.  
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hypothesis. In specific, with a same-state lending relationship, a syndicated loan borrower would pay 5 
more bps on spread, 2 more bps on fees and 6 more bps on overlibor with a standard deviation increase 
(0.12) in CR50 (Models 1-3). This is equivalent to additional costs of $186,000 on spread, $66,000 on fees 
and $234,000 on overlibor for an average loan.  
 
Table 4: Banking market concentration and syndicated loan price: borrowing from same-
state or out-of-state lead arrangers 
 
Samples collected are between 1994 and 2012 with 33,023 observations. Syndicated loan price is measured by spread, 
fees and overlibor. Banking market concentration is measured by concentration ratio (top 50) in the state where 
borrower and lead arranger located, respectively. We also control for the fixed effects of loan type, lender type and 
year and the results for control variables are not reported but available on request from the authors. In the ‘same state’ 
group, we consider sample syndicated loans if the borrower and lead arranger locate in the same state and therefore, 
both borrower and lender face the same banking market concentration measured by CR50Borrower. In the ‘different states’ 
group, we consider samples if the borrower and lead arranger locate in different states and therefore, we examine the 
effects of banking market concentration in borrower’s market and lender’s market respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at lender-firm year level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance level of 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
 Same state   Different states 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3   Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Spread Fees Overlibor   Spread Fees Overlibor 
         
CRK50Borrower 42.31* 14.95** 53.28*   16.17** 5.67*** 12.21 
 (23.46) (7.19) (30.56)   (7.61) (2.18) (10.39) 
CRK50Lender      17.27** 10.04*** 25.28** 
      (7.96) (1.99) (10.35) 
Constant 330.1*** 17.26 782.5***   390.6 72.55*** 390.6*** 
 (97.46) (28.22) (119.4)   (270,730) (11.52) (39.13) 
         
Other Controls YES YES YES   YES YES YES 
Observations 3,233 2,186 1,664   18,730 12,377 9,656 
R-squared 0.502 0.295 0.511   0.536 0.345 0.546 
Year FE YES YES YES   YES YES YES 
Purpose FE YES YES YES   YES YES YES 
LenderType FE YES YES YES   YES YES YES 
 
 
 Table 4 also shows that when a borrower raises syndicated loans led by a lead arranger from a different 
states, loan prices are associated with the concentration of both lender’s and borrower’s market but slightly 
more sensitive to the concentration of lead arranger’s banking market. For example, controlling for lender’s 
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market concentration (CR50Lead), a standard deviation (0.12) increase of borrower’s banking market 
concentration (CR50Borrower) would raise the spread, fees and overlibor by 1.9, 0.68 and 1.5 bps respectively 
(Models 1-3), supporting H1. In contrast, holding CR50Borrower at constant, a standard deviation increase of 
CR50Lead would raise the spread by 2.0 bps, fees by 1.2 bps and overlibor by 3.0 bps (Models 4-6), supporting 
H2. 
 
4.2.2 Is it beneficial to borrow from out-of-state lenders with lower bank concentration?  
Since banking market deregulation in the U.S (e.g. IBBEA) in 1990s, the proportion of syndicated loan 
deals with both lead arranger and borrower locating in the same state decreases from 25% in 1994 to 8% in 
2011. During the same period, deals led by arrangers from less concentrated banking market (CR50Difference 
= CR50Borrower - CR50Lead >0) increase from 35% to 50% and in 2011, 42% of deals were raised from lead 
arrangers headquartered in more concentrated market (CR50Difference<0; Panel A Figure 1). The value of deals 
of syndicated loan has also changed in a similar pattern where the total volume of deals raised in the same 
state has reduced and a greater volume of deals was raised from less concentrated banking markets (Panel 
B Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Borrowing from banks headquartering in the same state? 
 
Figure 1 shows the % of deals in numbers (Panel A) and value (Panel B) raised from banks headquartering in the same 
state as the borrower (CR50Difference=0), in other states with more concentrated market (CR50Difference<0) or in other states 
with less concentrated market (CR50Difference>0) between 1994 and 2011.  
 
Panel A: number of deals Panel B: value of deals 
 
  
  
In this section, we further investigate the ‘price-concentration’ relationship be considering the effects 
of the difference of bank concentration between borrower’s and lead arranger’s markets, CR50Difference. We 
start with descriptive statistics and Table 5 shows that borrowers may access out-of-state lead arranger for 
loan availability reasons when loan size is particularly big. For example, 18% of loans in first size quartile 
were raised from home-state leader arrangers and the proportion reduces to 7.7% for loans in the 4th size 
quartile. In addition, borrowers may also borrow from out-of-state lead arrangers for price reasons, 
especially when lead arrangers are non-banks. For example, Table 5 shows that out-of-state non-bank lead 
arrangers charge lower spread (by 46bps), fees (by 12bps) and overlibor (by 43bps). 
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Table 5: Borrowing from home state lender vs. out-of-state lender 
Samples collected are between 1994 and 2012 with 33,023 observations. We consider three possible scenarios – 
borrowing from local (home state) lead arranger, borrowing from out-of-state lead arrangers with less concentrated 
banking market (CR50Difference>0) and borrowing from out-of-state lead arrangers with more concentrated banking 
market (CR50Difference<0).  
 Mean Same state  
Out of 
state 
Less concentrated 
market 
(CR50Difference>0) 
More concentrated 
market 
(CR50Difference<0) 
Loan size quartile ($m and % of deals)   
1st quartile $26  17.92% 82.08% 41.98% 40.11% 
2nd quartile $103  11.76% 88.24% 39.75% 48.49% 
3rd quartile $251  8.37% 91.63% 38.07% 53.56% 
4th quartile $1,110  7.66% 92.34% 36.52% 55.82% 
Spread (bps)    
Non-bank 246.33 291.16  245.02 237.21  275.83  
Bank 178.81 173.46  179.62 188.38  174.58  
Commercial bank 174.32 171.02  174.82 187.21  167.26  
Investment bank 258.70 235.74  261.01 248.53  262.79  
Fees (bps)    
Non-bank 40.08 51.46 39.76 38.87 43.42 
Bank 29.10 27.72 29.31 30.94 28.40 
Commercial bank 28.49 27.56 28.63 20.70 27.44 
Investment bank 46.96 33.92 48.45 48.18 48.49 
Overlibor (bps)    
Non-bank 216.82 259.24 215.79 204.29 257.87 
Bank 168.32 164.93 168.82 172.66 166.42 
Commercial bank 165.12 162.98 165.44 172.42 160.82 
Investment bank 233.66 214.55 235.90 188.93 242.04 
 
 Table 6 reports the results that we regress loan prices on borrower’s market concentration 
(CRK50Borrower) and its difference with lead arranger’s market concentration (CR50Difference) by controlling for 
the same set of control variables used in the baseline model (Eq. 1). First, our baseline result still holds 
where loan prices increase with borrower’s bank market concentration, supporting H1. Second, it supports 
above predication that borrowers borrow from less concentrated bank market to reduce loan prices. For 
example, holding CR50Borrower constant, if the lead arranger headquarters in a state with a less concentrated 
banking market by one standard deviation (0.14), a typical borrower with an average loan size of $366 
million would have cost savings of $88,000 on spread, $51,000 on fees and $130,000 on overlibor, 
compared with those borrowers who borrower locally in the same state, supporting H2.  
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Table 6: Borrowing from out-of-state lenders 
Samples collected are between 1994 and 2012 with 33,023 observations. Syndicated loan price is measured by spread, 
fees and overlibor. Banking market concentration is measured by concentration ratio (top 50) in the state where 
borrower and lead arranger located, respectively. CR50Difference is defined as the difference of CR50 between borrower 
and lead arranger’s market, i.e. CR50Difference =CR50Borrower - CR50Lead. Therefore, CR50Difference>0 (<0) suggests that a 
borrower borrows from a less (more) concentrated banking market. In our data, there are no two markets have the 
same CR50 and therefore a borrower borrows from the same state if CR50Difference=0. We also control for the fixed 
effects of loan type, lender type and year and the results for control variables are not reported but available on request 
from the authors. Standard errors are clustered at lender-firm year level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denotes statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Spread Fees Overlibor 
    
CRK50Borrower 33.44*** 15.72*** 37.50*** 
 (11.25) (2.81) (14.73) 
CRK50Difference -17.27** -10.04*** -25.28** 
 (7.96) (1.99) (10.35) 
Constant 665.4*** 75.22*** 390.6*** 
 (29.65) (11.52) (39.13) 
Other Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 18,730 12,377 9,656 
R-squared 0.536 0.345 0.546 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Purpose FE YES YES YES 
LenderType FE YES YES YES 
 
4.3 Does the participant’s market power determine syndicated loan price?  
 To test H3, we regress loan prices on weighted participant’s market concentration (CRK50Participant) 
and lead arranger’s market concentration (CRK50Lead) by controlling for the same set of control variables 
used in the baseline model (Eq.1). Rejecting H3, Table 7 shows little evidence on the impacts of bank 
concentration on syndicated loan prices. Therefore, our empirical results so far suggest that syndicated loan 
prices are sensitive to bank concentration of both borrower’s market (H1) (e.g. Hasan et al. 2017; Lian 
2017) and lead arranger’s market (H2) but not participant lenders’ market (H3).  
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Table 7: Participants market power 
Samples collected are between 1994 and 2012 with 33,023 observations. Syndicated loan price is measured by spread, 
fees and overlibor. Banking market concentration is measured by concentration ratio (CR50) in the borrower’s market 
and the weighted participant bank market respectively. We control for the fixed effects of loan type, lender type and 
year. Results for control variables are not reported but available from the authors on request. Standard errors are 
clustered at lender-firm year level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significant level of 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Spread Fees Overlibor Spread Fees Overlibor 
CRK50Lead 
   46.24*** 
(11.44) 
9.20*** 
(2.84) 
37.31*** 
(13.04) 
CRK50Participant 
-6.85 
(10.78) 
-6.95 
(8.28) 
-5.72 
(12.82) 
-1.96 
(10.97) 
-7.40 
(8.71) 
-2.87 
(12.98) 
Constant 
1,037.47*** 
(43.67) 
86.63*** 
(13.34) 
774.49*** 
(81.66) 
765.21*** 
(47.69) 
125.83*** 
(12.67) 
428.67*** 
(63.08) 
Observations 8,088 6,445 6,025 7,230 5,738 5,350 
R-squared 0.540 0.345 0.586 0.545 0.352 0.590 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Lender Type FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
4.4 Robustness tests  
Overall, our earlier empirical results support both H1 and H2 that bank concentration of both 
borrower’s and lender’s market have an impact on syndicated loan prices and loan prices are not sensitive 
to participant lender’s market concentration (H3). We run a rich set of additional tests to examine the 
robustness of our results. First, we use alternative bank concentration measures, such as CR20Borrower (Model 
1), CR10Borrower (Model 2), HHI Branch deposit (Model 3), HHI Bank deposit (Model 4), Log(number of 
Branches) (Model 5), branch density by state size (Model 6) and HHI MSA (Model 7), and our results still 
hold. Second, we exclude samples in the financial crisis period, i.e. 2007-2009 (Model 8) and third, we 
consider sample loans with a type of revolver only (Model 9). Again, our earlier results are still robust10.  
 
                                                     
10 The robustness tests for the participant’s bank market are also available from the authors on request.  
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Table 8: Robustness test: alternative measures of banking market concentration 
This table reports the results of 8 robustness tests by using alternative measures of bank concentration (Models 1-7), samples excluding financial crisis period 
(Model 8) and sample loans with a type of revolver only (Model 9). We only report the estimate of the key variables and results for all other results are 
available from the authors on request. Standard errors are clustered at lender-firm year level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical 
significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
  Borrower’s market Lead Arranger’s market Difference 
Models  Spread Fees Overlibor Spread Fees Overlibor Spread Fees Overlibor 
1 CR20 21.77*** 
(6.11) 
5.96*** 
(1.78) 
10.07 
(8.35) 
20.79*** 
(7.38) 
11.16*** 
(1.94) 
33.92*** 
(9.68) 
-20.31*** 
(7.38) 
-11.00*** 
(1.45) 
-33.85*** 
(9.69) 
2 CR10 21.74*** 
(6.17) 
5.43*** 
(1.81) 
7.69 
(8.32) 
15.38** 
(7.28) 
10.29*** 
(1.90) 
29.29*** 
(9.53) 
-14.98** 
(7.28) 
-10.17*** 
(1.91) 
-29.35*** 
(9.54) 
3 HHI Branch deposit 87.65*** 
(26.09) 
21.82*** 
(7.01) 
59.49 
(37.21) 
259.69*** 
(57.50) 
65.73*** 
(19.45) 
138.21** 
(69.31) 
-252.54*** 
(57.92) 
-64.38*** 
(19.64) 
-131.29* 
(69.74) 
4 HHI Bank deposit 14.08** 
(6.06) 
1.30 
(1.76) 
3.61 
(7.78) 
12.94*** 
(4.96) 
0.50 
(1.29) 
4.15 
(6.13) 
-10.36** 
(4.14) 
-0.65 
(0.96) 
-2.27 
(5.10) 
5 Log(number of Branches) -5.53** 
(2.46) 
-1.08 
(0.67) 
-10.84*** 
(3.03) 
-1.63 
(1.06) 
-0.93*** 
(0.24) 
-2.01 
(1.29) 
1.56 
(1.06) 
0.92*** 
(0.24) 
1.83 
(1.29) 
6 Density by size (number of 
branches per km2) 
-10.31 
(19.93) 
-9.28** 
(4.69) 
-68.87*** 
(24.90) 
-35.19** 
(31.85) 
3.63 
(3.72) 
-4.67 
(18.93) 
35.12** 
(16.34) 
-3.99 
(3.73) 
2.61 
(19.07) 
7 
HHI (MSA) 
125.24*** 
(17.22) 
7.90* 
(4.53) 
141.89*** 
(21.44) 
108.43*** 
(18.79) 
4.02 
(3.98) 
135.76*** 
(21.28) 
-104.20*** 
(20.16) 
-4.38 
(4.36) 
-116.13*** 
(22.54) 
8 CR50Borrower (excluding samples 
from 2007-09 financial crisis) 
23.58*** 
(6.59) 
7.71*** 
(1.83) 
12.40 
(9.05) 
28.38*** 
(7.86) 
12.39*** 
(1.92) 
39.05*** 
(10.07) 
-27.48*** 
(7.85) 
-12.14*** 
(1.93) 
-38.88*** 
(10.09) 
9 CR50Borrower (loan type: revolver 
only) 
23.86*** 
(6.73) 
6.93*** 
(1.76) 
22.16** 
(9.01) 
17.47** 
(7.50) 
10.18*** 
(1.90) 
38.66*** 
(9.74) 
-16.73** 
(7.51) 
-9.95*** 
(1.91) 
-37.83*** 
(9.76) 
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4.5 Does lender type matter to the ‘price-concentration’ relationship? 
  We group sample loans according to the lead arranger’s types, commercial banks vs. non-commercial 
banks (investment banks and non-banks). Our data (Table 9) shows that about 4.25% of our sample deals 
are led by investment banks and 15.8% by non-bank lenders. The univariate test results show that compared 
with commercial bank lenders, investment banks and non-bank lenders are more likely to charge higher 
loan prices and issue term loans and loans with longer maturity. 
 
To test H4, we regress loan prices on borrower’s market concentration (CRK50Borrower), leader 
arranger’s market concentration (CRK50Lead) and the difference between them, CR50Difference (= CRK50Borrower 
- CRK50Lead), by controlling for the same set of control variables used in the baseline model (Eq. 1). We 
report the results in Table 1011. Our results on loans led by commercial banks are consistent with our earlier 
findings where loan prices increase with bank concentration in both borrower’s and lead arranger’s markets, 
and loans raised in less concentrated out-of-state markets (CR50Difference>0) are charged lower prices. In sharp 
contrast, the prices (spread and overlibor) of syndicated loans led by non-commercial banks, such as 
investment banks and non-bank lenders, decrease with bank market concentration (Models 2 and 6). Such 
a result could be driven by the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) model where in a more concentrated 
bank market, it will decrease the cost of funds for investment banks and non-banks. This is because financial 
institutions obtain funds from commercial banks with lower prices than corporate borrowers (Ahmed et al. 
2015) and with a greater market power, commercial banks pay lower interest rate to depositors and charge 
higher prices on loans, according to SCP. Hence, financial institutions could raise cheaper funds and offer 
more competitive prices to borrowers (Gropp et al. 2014) when banking market is concentrated. Results in 
                                                     
11 We also perform endogenous switching regression model to control for the selection basis arising from choices 
between commercial lead arranger and non-commercial lead arranger. The results are consistent with Table 10 and 
are available from the authors on request.  
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Panel B support this finding where non-commercial banks would have higher costs in less concentrated 
markets (CR50Difference>0) and hence charge higher prices on loans (Model 8).  
 
Table 9: Does lender type matter? Evidence from univariate analysis 
In this table, we compare the characteristics of loans across types of lead arrangers and identify the type of lenders 
by following (Lim et al. 2014). We run univariate tests (commercial vs. investment banks; banks vs. non-banks) and 
***, **, and * denotes statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
All 
Lenders 
Bank lenders 
Commercial 
Bank lenders 
Investment 
bank lenders 
Non-bank 
lenders 
Number of observations 33023 27736 26268 1468 5287 
Spread 186.56 178.81 174.32 258.70*** 246.33*** 
Fees 29.87 29.10 28.49 46.96*** 40.08*** 
Overlibor  172.73 168.32 165.12 233.66*** 216.82*** 
Loan size (USD$ m) 378 374 373 406 320*** 
Loan maturity (months) 46.19 46.32 45.69 57.79*** 49.88*** 
Total number of lenders 8.46 8.89 8.95 7.89*** 6.60*** 
Term loan (0,1) 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.48*** 0.36*** 
Covenant indicator (0,1) 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.68*** 0.61** 
Performance pricing feature (0,1) 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.44*** 0.38*** 
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Table 10: Does lender type matter? 
Samples collected are between 1994 and 2012 with a total number of observations of 33,023. Dependent variable is 
syndicated loan price measured by spread, fees and overlibor. According to the type of lead arranger, we group sample 
loans into ‘commercial bank’ loans and ‘non-commercial bank’ loans and non-commercial banks include both 
investment banks and non-bank lenders (e.g. hedge funds). In Panel A, banking market concentration is measured by 
concentration ratio (CR50Borrower and CR50Lead) in the borrower’s and lender’s market. In Panel B, banking market 
concentration is measured by concentration ratio (CR50Borrower) in the borrower’s market. CR50Difference is defined as the 
difference of CR50 between borrower and lead arranger’s market, i.e. CR50Difference =CR50Borrower - CR50Lead. Therefore, 
CR50Difference>0 (or <0) suggests that a borrower borrows from a less (or more) concentrated banking market. In our 
data, there are no two markets have the same CR50 and therefore a borrower borrows from the same state if   
CR50Difference=0. We also control for the fixed effects of loan type and year and the results for control variables are not 
reported but available on request from the authors. Standard errors are clustered at lender-firm year level and reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Spread Fees Overlibor 
 
Commercial 
Banks 
Non-
Commercial 
Banks 
Commercial 
Banks 
Non-
Commercial 
Banks 
Commercial 
Banks 
Non-
Commercial 
Banks 
Panel A Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
CR50Borrower 
15.59** 
(7.62) 
-38.26** 
(18.94) 
3.30* 
(1.98) 
11.05 
(9.48) 
18.41* 
(10.27) 
-87.07*** 
(28.98) 
CR50Lead 
34.11*** 
(7.57) 
-131.1*** 
(24.16) 
12.17*** 
(1.79) 
4.81 
(13.19) 
38.06*** 
(9.65) 
-63.85 
(43.47) 
Constant 
492.3*** 
(28.02) 
654.0*** 
(70.08) 
92.72*** 
(10.45) 
88.23** 
(36.94) 
528.8*** 
(37.92) 
729.8*** 
(116.7) 
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 19,169 2,794 13,243 1,320 10,141 1,179 
R-squared 0.493 0.427 0.321 0.207 0.523 0.402 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Lender Type FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Panel B Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
CR50Borrower 
49.70*** 
(10.47) 
-171.4*** 
(31.62) 
15.27*** 
(2.49) 
15.86 
(17.12) 
56.47*** 
(13.45) 
-150.9*** 
(53.22) 
CR50Difference 
-34.11*** 
(7.57) 
133.1*** 
(24.16) 
-12.17*** 
(1.79) 
-4.81 
(13.19) 
-38.06*** 
(9.65) 
63.85 
(43.47) 
Constant 
492.3*** 
(28.02) 
654.0*** 
(70.08) 
92.72*** 
(10.45) 
88.23** 
(36.49) 
528.8*** 
(37.92) 
729.8*** 
(116.7) 
Other Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 19,169 2,794 13,243 1,320 10,141 1,179 
R-squared 0.493 0.427 0.321 0.207 0.523 0.402 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Purpose FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Lender Type FE NO NO NO NO NO NO 
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4.6 Endogeneity 
An endogeneity issue may exist in our analysis and there is a particular concern on the ‘reverse 
causality’ effect where states differ in their syndicated loan prices and such differences may trigger the 
change of bank market concentration in a specific state12. This effect could be more pronounced when we 
consider ‘same-state’ lending relationships. Hence, we employ Eq. 2 to test if there is a reverse causality 
between bank market structure and syndicated loan prices: 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ×
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3 × 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝜀    ∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙ Eq.(2) 
 
The results reported in Panel A Table 11 show little evidence on the existence of the reverse causality issue 
where syndicated loan prices do not affect banking market concentration at a statistically significant level13.  
The other possible reason for endogeneity is the ‘omitted variables’ effects. For example, unobservable 
state-level factors varying across states may influence the timing of deregulation and have further impacts 
on bank market structure in different states. To address this issue, we follow Cornaggia et al. (2015) to 
perform a placebo test to investigate if our results are driven by those unobservable and omitted state 
specific factors. We run the placebo test by randomly reordering banking market concentration within same 
state where a syndicated loan is raised. We replace CR50Borrower by a fake-CR50
Borrower and re-run the baseline 
model (Eq. 1). Panel B (Table 11) shows that the coefficients of fake-CR50
Borrower are statistically 
insignificant in all loan price models. Therefore, our earlier results are robust and not subject to endogeneity.  
                                                     
12 In Eq(1), we use one-year lagged concentration to overcome the possible reverse causality issue.  
13 We also consider loan prices (e.g. spread, overlibor) at time t-1 and our results still hold. 
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Table 11: Tests of endogeneity 
Samples collected are between 1994 and 2012 with a total number of observations of 33,023. In Panel A, the 
dependent variable is CR50Borrower when loan was raised in year t. CR50,t-1Borrower is borrower’s market concentration 
in year t-1. In Panel B, dependent variable is syndicated loan price measured by spread, fees and overlibor. We 
use a fake concentration measure (fake-CR50Borrower) and run a placebo test. We also control for the fixed effects 
of loan type and year and the results for control variables are not reported but available on request from the 
authors. Standard errors are clustered at lender-firm year level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes 
statistical significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Panel A 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CR50,tBorrower CR50,tBorrower CR50,tBorrower 
CR50, t-1Borrower  
1.01*** 
     (0.00) 
1.01*** 
(0.00) 
1.02*** 
(0.00) 
Spread 
-8.61e-07 
(0.00) 
 
Fee  
6.99e-07 
(0.00) 
 
Overlibor   
-2.44e-06 
(0.00) 
Constant 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.08*** 
(0.01) 
-0.09*** 
(0.01) 
State controls YES YES YES 
Observations 30,389 19,036 15,174 
R-squared 0.957 0.957 0.957 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Loan purpose FE YES YES YES 
Lender type FE YES YES YES 
 Panel B 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Spread Fees Overlibor 
fake-CR50Borrower 
0.63 
(3.46) 
-1.41 
(0.92) 
0.52 
(4.58) 
Constant 
521.2 
(102209.3) 
160.1*** 
(7.85) 
636.2*** 
(30.46) 
Other controls YES YES YES 
Observations 28,198 18,225 14,470 
R-squared 0.516 0.325 0.520 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Loan purpose FE YES YES YES 
Lender type FE YES YES YES 
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5. Summary and conclusion 
 
There have been both theoretical and empirical studies on the ‘price-concentration’ relationship in 
existing literature on both banking (e.g. bilateral loan) and product markets. However, there has been little 
evidence on such a relationship in a syndicated loan setting. Focusing on borrower’s bank market 
concentration, recent evidence (e.g. Hasan et al. 2017; Lian 2017) shows a positive relationship between 
bank market concentration and syndicated loan prices. What is little known, however, is how bank 
concentration of lead arranger’s market, participant lenders’ market and lender type moderate such a ‘price-
concentration’ relationship. To fill in this gap, this paper empirically investigates how syndicated loan 
prices, in terms of spread, fees and overlibor, react to bank concentration of the markets where borrower 
(H1), lead arranger (H2) and participant lenders (H3) locate. We show supporting evidence to market power 
hypothesis where syndicated loan prices are positively associated with bank concentration of both 
borrower’s and lead arranger’s markets but not participant lenders’ markets. Our results also show that if a 
borrower raises syndicated loan led by a lead arranger from a different state, loan prices are more sensitive 
to the bank concentration of lender’s market than to that of borrower’s market. In addition, we show 
borrowers could reduce loan prices by borrowing from less concentrated bank markets. 
In sharp contrast, syndicated loan prices are negatively associated with bank market concentration if 
the lead arranger is a non-commercial bank (H4). Our empirical findings imply that corporate borrowers 
could pay lower loan prices if they borrow from commercial banks in a less concentrated bank market. If 
they face a concentrated bank market, it would be beneficial to borrow from non-commercial banks. 
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Appendix: Definition and source of variables  
Variables Definition Sources 
Bank market concentration  
CR50Borrower 
Top 50 branch deposit concentration ratio in borrower’s bank market at state 
level.  
FDIC 
CR50Lead 
Top 50 branch deposit concentration ratio in lender’s bank market at state 
level.  
FDIC 
CR50Participant 
Share weighted average of participants’ bank market concentration, based on 
top 50 branch deposit concentration ratio at state level. 
FDIC 
CR50Difference CR50Difference =CR50Borrower - CR50Lead FDIC 
CR20 Top 20 branch deposit concentration ratio in bank market at state level.  FDIC 
CR10 Top 10 branch deposit concentration ratio in bank market at state level.  FDIC 
HHI Branch Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of branch deposit at state level. FDIC 
HHI Bank Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of bank deposit at state level. FDIC 
HHI MSA Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of branch deposit at MSA level. FDIC 
Number of Branches The total number of deposit branches at state level.  FDIC 
Branch density by 
population 
Number of branches per 1000 population.   
Federal Reserve 
Bank of ST. Louis 
Branch density by state 
size 
Number of branches per km2. FDIC 
Syndication Price   
Spread 
All-in-drawn-spread: basis point spread over LIBOR plus the annual fee and 
the up-front 
 fee spread, if there is any. 
DealScan 
Fees 
All-in-undrawn-spread: commitment fee plus annual fee, i.e., the amount a 
borrower pays for each dollar available under a commitment. 
 
DealScan 
Overlibor Basis point over LIBOR for the first run of loan.  DealScan 
Facility Characteristics   
Log(Loan size) Natural Log of loan amount in $m DealScan 
Log(Loan maturity) Natural Log of loan maturity in months DealScan 
Total number of lenders Number of participating lenders in the facility syndicate DealScan 
Term loan dummy 
= 1 if the facility type is term loan facility (including term loan A, term loan 
B….), and 0 otherwise 
DealScan 
Secured indicator =1 if the loan has collateral DealScan 
Convents indicator = 1 if the loan has convents, and 0 otherwise  DealScan 
Performance pricing 
dummy 
= 1 if the loan has performance pricing features, and 0 otherwise  DealScan 
Borrower Firm Characteristics  
Log(Asset) 
Natural Log of the total asset in £m of the borrower at the end of fiscal year 
prior to the loan originated.  
Compustat 
Tangibility The sum of net property, equipment and pant, divided by total asset Compustat 
Profitability Net income/total asset Compustat 
S&P rating =1 if the company has a S&P rating from “AAA” to “BBB”. Compustat 
Macroeconomic Factors   
State personal annual 
income($000) 
The average personal annual income in state. 
Federal Reserve 
Bank of ST. Louis 
State Gross Domestic 
Product ($bn) 
The annual gross domestic product by state 
Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis 
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